BEC & Phishing Attacks on Merchants
- Changed invoice or bank details? Verify the vendor
- Already sent a wire? Call your bank now
- Someone says they're your processor? Check the request
- Use a saved contact, never the message's number
- Gave someone access? Secure the account and payouts
An invoice has new bank details, or someone says they're your processor. Stop and check through a contact you already know. For invoices, verify the vendor. Sent a wire? Call your bank now. For an account warning, check your provider.
Getting a message doesn't mean someone got into your account. You can check the request before taking its next step.
BEC and phishing aren't channel-specific. They hit your back office whether you're card-present or card-not-present. Wire fraud, payroll redirect, and vendor impersonation work the same in a retail store or an e-commerce site.
What Makes BEC Different
| Traditional Payment Fraud | BEC/Phishing |
|---|---|
| Fraudster uses stolen card | Fraudster impersonates trusted party |
| Hits your checkout | Hits your email/phone |
| Checkout fraud rules can screen it | Checkout card screening can miss it. Payee and change monitoring can catch it |
| Customer disputes afterward | You may be deceived into making the payment. A compromised account can also move money or steal data without you |
| Chargeback possible | Ask your bank immediately about a wire recall; recovery isn't guaranteed |
The key difference: When you're deceived into sending a wire or a bank-account ACH transfer yourself, there's no card-network chargeback, and checkout card screening may not see it. Call your bank right away and ask what it can stop or recall. Recovery isn't guaranteed, and your rights depend on the payment rail and who had authority.
A purchase funded by card has its own claim rules, such as Visa's non-receipt route. BEC also covers compromised accounts making unauthorized transfers, and stolen data (FBI IC3, 11 September 2024). To catch it sooner, pair call-backs with monitoring of payees, changes and unusual payments (Nacha's fraud monitoring rule, practical effective date 22 June 2026).
Is this really my processor or platform?
Someone says your account will close unless you sign in, share a code or pay. Don't use the message's link, number or QR code. Open your saved app or bookmark instead.
Check notices there, then open official support. No notice? That alone doesn't prove the message is fake. Ask about the requirement and deadline before acting.
I received a request saying [requirement]. I opened support myself. Is there a real requirement on my account? Where can I see it? I haven't acted on that message.
How did the conversation start? Square may use a code when you contact its support. Never read a code to someone who called you. End that call and open support yourself.
| Provider | What its own guidance says | Where to check or report |
|---|---|---|
| Stripe | It won't ask for passwords, bank credentials or other sensitive information by email. A real account-information review can still need checking | Open Dashboard directly. Use its account-security tips and current domain guidance, which links to Support |
| Square (US) | It won't ask for full bank or payment-card details by email, phone or text. When you contact Square Support, it may use a one-time passcode for verification | Open official Support yourself. If the email has no reporting link, forward it to spoof@squareup.com |
| Shopify | It doesn't request sensitive information in email text, images or attachments. It uses a secure upload page for sensitive documents | Contact Shopify Support about suspicious calls or texts. Forward phishing messages to phishing@shopify.com |
| PayPal (US) | Its customer-service warning rejects password or two-factor-code requests, test payments and software downloads | Open the PayPal Help Center yourself. Report phishing to phishing@paypal.com |
Those are what each provider says it won't ask for. A familiar voice, logo or sender name can't verify the request. HTTPS encrypts the connection; it doesn't establish who's asking. Email lures are phishing, phone lures are vishing, and text lures are smishing. A phone scam alone isn't business email compromise.
Choose the next step for what happened:
- Nothing shared or paid? Verify through official support, then report the suspicious request
- Gave access, found unknown users, lost access or saw changed payouts? Secure the account and check payouts
- Money sent? Contact the sending bank or app immediately. Ask what it can stop or recover. For a wire, use the wire response. Recovery isn't guaranteed
Keep the message, timestamp, requested action and real case or transaction reference. Keep passwords and codes out of the report. If someone else helps, record who checked and which independent channel they used.
Want help listing questions? Use the AI practice example with private details removed. It can't authenticate the sender.
Someone's at the counter claiming to service your terminal? Use Terminal Security's technician checks.
The Attack Types
1. Vendor Invoice Fraud
This one rides on a vendor you already pay:
- A fraudster maps your vendors: breach, social engineering, public info
- They build an invoice that looks like the vendor's
- It carries "updated banking information" for the payment
- You pay it, and the money's gone
- The real vendor calls later asking where payment went
Red flags:
- "Updated bank account" or "new payment details"
- Urgency: "Please update before next payment run"
- Email address slightly off (vendorname@vendor-inc.com vs vendor@vendor.com)
- Invoice format differs from usual
- Request to not call usual contact to verify
A payment-change request can hit a business at any volume. Set controls from payment sizes, payee changes and cash exposure, not a monthly dollar cutoff.
2. CEO/Executive Impersonation
This one runs on rank and hurry, not technology:
- A fraudster reads your execs off LinkedIn, your site, press
- They spoof the email, or take the account outright
- Finance gets an urgent note: "Wire $47,000 to this account for confidential acquisition"
- It's urgent, it's secret, and it skips the usual process
- The employee pays rather than look slow to the CEO
Common scenarios:
- Fake M&A deals ("confidential, don't discuss with team")
- Emergency vendor payments ("need this today")
- Gift card requests ("buy $2,000 in gift cards for client appreciation, send codes to me")
- Payroll adjustments ("add this contractor to next payroll run")
Red flags:
- Request to bypass normal approval process
- Unusual urgency
- An unexpected, urgent request to buy gift cards or send their codes
- Emphasis on secrecy
- Sender is traveling or "in meetings all day"
3. Employee Payroll Redirect
This one looks like routine HR admin:
- A fraudster emails HR pretending to be your employee
- They ask payroll to point the direct deposit somewhere new
- The next paycheck lands in the fraudster's account
- The real employee asks where the money went
Red flags:
- Email-only request (no phone confirmation)
- New email address or slightly altered sender
- Request shortly before payroll run
- Employee recently promoted or transferred (more plausible reason for changes)
4. Credential Phishing
Credential phishing doesn't take money, it takes the keys:
- An employee gets an email that looks like it's from your processor, bank, or an internal system
- The link goes to a login page that looks right
- The employee types the password in
- The fraudster is now inside your payment systems
Targets:
- Processor admin portals
- Banking platforms
- Accounting software (QuickBooks, NetSuite)
- Internal expense systems
- Payroll platforms
Red flags:
- Unexpected login prompts
- URL doesn't match legitimate domain (paypa1.com, stripe-login.net)
- Request to re-enter credentials for "security verification"
- Threats of account suspension
The Numbers
| FBI IC3 BEC measure | 2025 |
|---|---|
| Complaints | 24,768 |
| Reported losses | $3,046,598,558 |
Source: FBI IC3 2025 annual report, complaint-count and complaint-loss tables, pages 7-8. These are reported BEC losses across payment methods, not ACH-only losses.
Prevention Framework
Layer 1: Process Controls
| Control | What It Does |
|---|---|
| Dual approval for wires | Two people must approve wire transfers |
| Callback verification | Call vendor at known number (not from email) before changing payment details |
| Out-of-band confirmation | Verify unusual requests via different channel (call, Slack, in-person) |
| Payment change freeze | Set an internal delay from the time needed for independent callback verification and payment deadlines; elapsed time alone doesn't validate the change |
| No gift card policy | Never buy gift cards for "business purposes" via email request |
Layer 2: Technical Controls
| Control | What It Does |
|---|---|
| Email authentication (DMARC/DKIM/SPF) | Harder to spoof your domain |
| External email banners | "[EXTERNAL]" warning on emails from outside organization |
| Link protection | Rewrite URLs to check reputation |
| MFA on all financial systems | Stolen password alone isn't enough |
| Conditional access | Block logins from unusual locations/devices |
Layer 3: Training
| Focus Area | Key Points |
|---|---|
| Recognize urgency manipulation | Legitimate requests can wait for verification |
| Verify before trusting | Call known numbers, not numbers from the suspicious email |
| Report, don't ignore | Better to report a legitimate email than miss an attack |
| Gift card requests | Make it your policy that nobody sends codes by email, and verify any request through a saved channel (FTC's guide) |
Test to Run
30-day exercise:
- Audit your wire process: How many approvals, who can give them, and what gets verified?
- Review vendor payment changes: Pull the last 6 months and look for callbacks
- Check email security: Is DMARC enforced, and are external banners on?
- Run a phishing test: Send finance a simulated phish and count the clicks
Success criteria: zero single-approval wires and 100% callback verification on payment changes. Compare phishing clicks and reports with your own earlier exercise using a similar lure and audience. Review every missed report.
Response Playbook
If You Sent a Wire
The sooner your bank can act, the better the chance of stopping funds before they move again.
- Call your bank immediately. Phone, not email or chat
- Ask them to recall the wire
- Give them the receiving account details from the wire
- File the FBI IC3 complaint at ic3.gov
- Call local law enforcement, get a report number
- Write down every step and the time
Recovery odds: there's no guarantee. Ask your bank what it can still stop or recall. FBI IC3 guidance says to contact your financial institution immediately and request a recall.
If Credentials Were Compromised
- Reset every affected password, starting with the money systems
- Revoke active sessions on all of those accounts
- Turn on MFA anywhere it wasn't already on
- Read the access logs for anything you can't explain
- Check for new users, payment changes, or transactions you didn't make
- Tell any vendor or customer whose data was exposed
Where This Breaks
Remote/distributed teams: Harder to verify in person. Set up the channel before you need it: a phone number you saved when you started working together, or the person's manager through your own directory. Never a number from the request.
High employee turnover: New employees don't know what's normal. Onboarding must include security training and clear escalation paths.
Vendor-heavy operations: More vendors = more attack surface. A one-off vendor can be impersonated too, so check any changed payment details through the same saved contact.
Executive override culture: If executives routinely bypass approval processes, employees learn to comply with "urgent" requests. Culture must support verification.
Scale Callout
| Business Size | Focus |
|---|---|
| Under $1M revenue | Basic controls: a callback on any payment change, dual approval on wires, external email banners, no gift card policy |
| $1M-$10M revenue | Add DMARC enforcement, phishing training |
| Over $10M revenue | Dedicated security awareness program, regular phishing simulations, vendor security assessments |
Next Steps
Setting up defenses?
- Require dual approval on every wire: No single point of failure
- Add external email banners: Simple, and they work from day one
- Train your finance team to verify: Callbacks to known numbers
Already been targeted?
- Work the response steps: Money first, then access
- Review the attack, then update your processes: Close the gap that was exploited
- Share anonymized details with industry peers: They're targets too
Building security culture?
- Run phishing simulations: Measure, don't assume
- Reward reporting: Make "I almost fell for this" a positive
- No blame for verification delays: Better slow and safe than fast and defrauded
Related Resources
- Prevent Fraud: The fraud hub
- Wire Transfers: Wire fraud context
- Account Takeover: Related attack pattern
- Fraud Types: Full fraud taxonomy
- PCI DSS: data security requirements
- Identity Verification: Verifying who you're dealing with
- Vendor Management: Operational controls
- Survive Fraud Attack: Emergency response
- Payroll & Tax Fraud: W2 theft, payroll processor ATO, and tax fraud beyond BEC redirect
- Outbound ACH Fraud: Supplier payment fraud and ACH origination risks
- Business Banking ATO: When attackers target your bank account directly
- Check overpayment or a deposit refund request
Sources
These sources support the provider-message checks above. Opened 22 October 2026; the provider rows describe their own public guidance.
| Source | What it supports | Opened |
|---|---|---|
| FTC: small-business scams | Impersonation, urgency, caller-ID caution and reporting | 22 October 2026 |
| Stripe: account-information review VENDOR | Email-specific sensitive-information limit; direct Dashboard check | 22 October 2026 |
| Stripe: account security VENDOR | Saved sign-in bookmark and credential protection | 22 October 2026 |
| Stripe: verified domains VENDOR | Maintained domain guidance and Support route | 22 October 2026 |
| Square US: phishing VENDOR | Full bank/card details limit; OTP when contacting Support; suspicious-call and email reporting | 22 October 2026 |
| Shopify: phishing, vishing and smishing VENDOR | Email versus secure-upload boundary, channel terms and reporting | 22 October 2026 |
| PayPal US: scams VENDOR | Customer-service impersonation limits, Help Center and phishing reporting | 22 October 2026 |
| FTC: scam response | Immediate bank/app reporting for money sent, asking for reversal without a recovery promise | 22 October 2026 |
| FBI IC3: BEC response | Immediate financial-institution contact and recall request after a fraudulent transfer | 22 October 2026 |