Skip to main content

BEC & Phishing Attacks on Merchants

TL;DR

An invoice has new bank details, or someone says they're your processor. Stop and check through a contact you already know. For invoices, verify the vendor. Sent a wire? Call your bank now. For an account warning, check your provider.

Don't Panic

Getting a message doesn't mean someone got into your account. You can check the request before taking its next step.

CP vs CNP

BEC and phishing aren't channel-specific. They hit your back office whether you're card-present or card-not-present. Wire fraud, payroll redirect, and vendor impersonation work the same in a retail store or an e-commerce site.

What Makes BEC Different​

Traditional Payment FraudBEC/Phishing
Fraudster uses stolen cardFraudster impersonates trusted party
Hits your checkoutHits your email/phone
Checkout fraud rules can screen itCheckout card screening can miss it. Payee and change monitoring can catch it
Customer disputes afterwardYou may be deceived into making the payment. A compromised account can also move money or steal data without you
Chargeback possibleAsk your bank immediately about a wire recall; recovery isn't guaranteed

The key difference: When you're deceived into sending a wire or a bank-account ACH transfer yourself, there's no card-network chargeback, and checkout card screening may not see it. Call your bank right away and ask what it can stop or recall. Recovery isn't guaranteed, and your rights depend on the payment rail and who had authority.

A purchase funded by card has its own claim rules, such as Visa's non-receipt route. BEC also covers compromised accounts making unauthorized transfers, and stolen data (FBI IC3, 11 September 2024). To catch it sooner, pair call-backs with monitoring of payees, changes and unusual payments (Nacha's fraud monitoring rule, practical effective date 22 June 2026).


Is this really my processor or platform?​

Someone says your account will close unless you sign in, share a code or pay. Don't use the message's link, number or QR code. Open your saved app or bookmark instead.

Check notices there, then open official support. No notice? That alone doesn't prove the message is fake. Ask about the requirement and deadline before acting.

I received a request saying [requirement]. I opened support myself. Is there a real requirement on my account? Where can I see it? I haven't acted on that message.

How did the conversation start? Square may use a code when you contact its support. Never read a code to someone who called you. End that call and open support yourself.

ProviderWhat its own guidance saysWhere to check or report
StripeIt won't ask for passwords, bank credentials or other sensitive information by email. A real account-information review can still need checkingOpen Dashboard directly. Use its account-security tips and current domain guidance, which links to Support
Square (US)It won't ask for full bank or payment-card details by email, phone or text. When you contact Square Support, it may use a one-time passcode for verificationOpen official Support yourself. If the email has no reporting link, forward it to spoof@squareup.com
ShopifyIt doesn't request sensitive information in email text, images or attachments. It uses a secure upload page for sensitive documentsContact Shopify Support about suspicious calls or texts. Forward phishing messages to phishing@shopify.com
PayPal (US)Its customer-service warning rejects password or two-factor-code requests, test payments and software downloadsOpen the PayPal Help Center yourself. Report phishing to phishing@paypal.com

Those are what each provider says it won't ask for. A familiar voice, logo or sender name can't verify the request. HTTPS encrypts the connection; it doesn't establish who's asking. Email lures are phishing, phone lures are vishing, and text lures are smishing. A phone scam alone isn't business email compromise.

Choose the next step for what happened:

  • Nothing shared or paid? Verify through official support, then report the suspicious request
  • Gave access, found unknown users, lost access or saw changed payouts? Secure the account and check payouts
  • Money sent? Contact the sending bank or app immediately. Ask what it can stop or recover. For a wire, use the wire response. Recovery isn't guaranteed

Keep the message, timestamp, requested action and real case or transaction reference. Keep passwords and codes out of the report. If someone else helps, record who checked and which independent channel they used.

Want help listing questions? Use the AI practice example with private details removed. It can't authenticate the sender.

Someone's at the counter claiming to service your terminal? Use Terminal Security's technician checks.


The Attack Types​

1. Vendor Invoice Fraud​

This one rides on a vendor you already pay:

  1. A fraudster maps your vendors: breach, social engineering, public info
  2. They build an invoice that looks like the vendor's
  3. It carries "updated banking information" for the payment
  4. You pay it, and the money's gone
  5. The real vendor calls later asking where payment went

Red flags:

  • "Updated bank account" or "new payment details"
  • Urgency: "Please update before next payment run"
  • Email address slightly off (vendorname@vendor-inc.com vs vendor@vendor.com)
  • Invoice format differs from usual
  • Request to not call usual contact to verify

A payment-change request can hit a business at any volume. Set controls from payment sizes, payee changes and cash exposure, not a monthly dollar cutoff.

2. CEO/Executive Impersonation​

This one runs on rank and hurry, not technology:

  1. A fraudster reads your execs off LinkedIn, your site, press
  2. They spoof the email, or take the account outright
  3. Finance gets an urgent note: "Wire $47,000 to this account for confidential acquisition"
  4. It's urgent, it's secret, and it skips the usual process
  5. The employee pays rather than look slow to the CEO

Common scenarios:

  • Fake M&A deals ("confidential, don't discuss with team")
  • Emergency vendor payments ("need this today")
  • Gift card requests ("buy $2,000 in gift cards for client appreciation, send codes to me")
  • Payroll adjustments ("add this contractor to next payroll run")

Red flags:

  • Request to bypass normal approval process
  • Unusual urgency
  • An unexpected, urgent request to buy gift cards or send their codes
  • Emphasis on secrecy
  • Sender is traveling or "in meetings all day"

3. Employee Payroll Redirect​

This one looks like routine HR admin:

  1. A fraudster emails HR pretending to be your employee
  2. They ask payroll to point the direct deposit somewhere new
  3. The next paycheck lands in the fraudster's account
  4. The real employee asks where the money went

Red flags:

  • Email-only request (no phone confirmation)
  • New email address or slightly altered sender
  • Request shortly before payroll run
  • Employee recently promoted or transferred (more plausible reason for changes)

4. Credential Phishing​

Credential phishing doesn't take money, it takes the keys:

  1. An employee gets an email that looks like it's from your processor, bank, or an internal system
  2. The link goes to a login page that looks right
  3. The employee types the password in
  4. The fraudster is now inside your payment systems

Targets:

  • Processor admin portals
  • Banking platforms
  • Accounting software (QuickBooks, NetSuite)
  • Internal expense systems
  • Payroll platforms

Red flags:

  • Unexpected login prompts
  • URL doesn't match legitimate domain (paypa1.com, stripe-login.net)
  • Request to re-enter credentials for "security verification"
  • Threats of account suspension

The Numbers​

FBI IC3 BEC measure2025
Complaints24,768
Reported losses$3,046,598,558

Source: FBI IC3 2025 annual report, complaint-count and complaint-loss tables, pages 7-8. These are reported BEC losses across payment methods, not ACH-only losses.


Prevention Framework​

Layer 1: Process Controls​

ControlWhat It Does
Dual approval for wiresTwo people must approve wire transfers
Callback verificationCall vendor at known number (not from email) before changing payment details
Out-of-band confirmationVerify unusual requests via different channel (call, Slack, in-person)
Payment change freezeSet an internal delay from the time needed for independent callback verification and payment deadlines; elapsed time alone doesn't validate the change
No gift card policyNever buy gift cards for "business purposes" via email request

Layer 2: Technical Controls​

ControlWhat It Does
Email authentication (DMARC/DKIM/SPF)Harder to spoof your domain
External email banners"[EXTERNAL]" warning on emails from outside organization
Link protectionRewrite URLs to check reputation
MFA on all financial systemsStolen password alone isn't enough
Conditional accessBlock logins from unusual locations/devices

Layer 3: Training​

Focus AreaKey Points
Recognize urgency manipulationLegitimate requests can wait for verification
Verify before trustingCall known numbers, not numbers from the suspicious email
Report, don't ignoreBetter to report a legitimate email than miss an attack
Gift card requestsMake it your policy that nobody sends codes by email, and verify any request through a saved channel (FTC's guide)

Test to Run​

30-day exercise:

  1. Audit your wire process: How many approvals, who can give them, and what gets verified?
  2. Review vendor payment changes: Pull the last 6 months and look for callbacks
  3. Check email security: Is DMARC enforced, and are external banners on?
  4. Run a phishing test: Send finance a simulated phish and count the clicks

Success criteria: zero single-approval wires and 100% callback verification on payment changes. Compare phishing clicks and reports with your own earlier exercise using a similar lure and audience. Review every missed report.


Response Playbook​

If You Sent a Wire​

The sooner your bank can act, the better the chance of stopping funds before they move again.

  1. Call your bank immediately. Phone, not email or chat
  2. Ask them to recall the wire
  3. Give them the receiving account details from the wire
  4. File the FBI IC3 complaint at ic3.gov
  5. Call local law enforcement, get a report number
  6. Write down every step and the time

Recovery odds: there's no guarantee. Ask your bank what it can still stop or recall. FBI IC3 guidance says to contact your financial institution immediately and request a recall.

If Credentials Were Compromised​

  1. Reset every affected password, starting with the money systems
  2. Revoke active sessions on all of those accounts
  3. Turn on MFA anywhere it wasn't already on
  4. Read the access logs for anything you can't explain
  5. Check for new users, payment changes, or transactions you didn't make
  6. Tell any vendor or customer whose data was exposed

Where This Breaks​

Remote/distributed teams: Harder to verify in person. Set up the channel before you need it: a phone number you saved when you started working together, or the person's manager through your own directory. Never a number from the request.

High employee turnover: New employees don't know what's normal. Onboarding must include security training and clear escalation paths.

Vendor-heavy operations: More vendors = more attack surface. A one-off vendor can be impersonated too, so check any changed payment details through the same saved contact.

Executive override culture: If executives routinely bypass approval processes, employees learn to comply with "urgent" requests. Culture must support verification.


Scale Callout​

Business SizeFocus
Under $1M revenueBasic controls: a callback on any payment change, dual approval on wires, external email banners, no gift card policy
$1M-$10M revenueAdd DMARC enforcement, phishing training
Over $10M revenueDedicated security awareness program, regular phishing simulations, vendor security assessments

Next Steps​

Setting up defenses?

  1. Require dual approval on every wire: No single point of failure
  2. Add external email banners: Simple, and they work from day one
  3. Train your finance team to verify: Callbacks to known numbers

Already been targeted?

  1. Work the response steps: Money first, then access
  2. Review the attack, then update your processes: Close the gap that was exploited
  3. Share anonymized details with industry peers: They're targets too

Building security culture?

  1. Run phishing simulations: Measure, don't assume
  2. Reward reporting: Make "I almost fell for this" a positive
  3. No blame for verification delays: Better slow and safe than fast and defrauded

Sources​

These sources support the provider-message checks above. Opened 22 October 2026; the provider rows describe their own public guidance.

SourceWhat it supportsOpened
FTC: small-business scamsImpersonation, urgency, caller-ID caution and reporting22 October 2026
Stripe: account-information review VENDOREmail-specific sensitive-information limit; direct Dashboard check22 October 2026
Stripe: account security VENDORSaved sign-in bookmark and credential protection22 October 2026
Stripe: verified domains VENDORMaintained domain guidance and Support route22 October 2026
Square US: phishing VENDORFull bank/card details limit; OTP when contacting Support; suspicious-call and email reporting22 October 2026
Shopify: phishing, vishing and smishing VENDOREmail versus secure-upload boundary, channel terms and reporting22 October 2026
PayPal US: scams VENDORCustomer-service impersonation limits, Help Center and phishing reporting22 October 2026
FTC: scam responseImmediate bank/app reporting for money sent, asking for reversal without a recovery promise22 October 2026
FBI IC3: BEC responseImmediate financial-institution contact and recall request after a fraudulent transfer22 October 2026

Something wrong on this page? Email matt at paymentsandrisk.com and say what needs fixing.